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Abstract 
Asian economic regionalism has emerged from a bottom-up process, driven by market 
forces in the absence of a grand plan for regional integration. While the financial crisis of 
1997–98 triggered new regional cooperation initiatives, more recently several Asian political 
leaders have formulated proposals for the creation of a regional economic community, 
suggesting the possible start of a top-down approach. Based on the results of a survey of 
Asia’s opinion leaders conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2010, this paper 
discusses how Asia’s institutional architecture for economic and financial integration is taking 
shape, suggesting the need to strengthen existing institutions that promote Asian 
regionalism and to create new ones. While the focus of the paper is on monetary and 
financial integration, the analysis also covers other integration pillars such as trade and 
investment, connectivity and infrastructure, and regional public goods. It suggests the need 
to create new institutions in support of Asian regionalism and to adopt a broad perspective in 
moving towards the formation of a region-wide economic community based on strong 
political commitment and grassroots participation. 
JEL Classification: F15, F36, F55, H87, O53 
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1.  INSTITUTIONS FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The well-known “Balassa” scheme describing the process of economic regionalism includes 
five stages of progressive integration: a free trade area, a customs union, a single market, a 
common currency, and a political union. While this sequencing is supposed to apply to any 
of the world’s regions, in practice it is a reflection of European ideas, reflecting not only 
Europe’s economic reality, but also its philosophical foundations and the underlying political 
debate (Balassa 1961).  
Although the idea of economic regionalism in Asia has been—and to a certain extent still 
is—influenced by the theoretical and practical developments experienced in Europe, it has 
quite different origins. As recent studies have shown, the process of economic regionalism in 
Asia has been primarily induced by market forces. Coordinated intergovernmental initiatives 
for cooperation, including the creation of regional institutions, have lagged behind. Unlike 
Europe, economic integration in Asia has emerged without a grand plan for creating a united 
front across the countries in the region (ADB 2008; Drysdale 2006; Kawai 2005; Petri 2006; 
Soesastro 2006).  
Regional institutions have played an important role in bringing Asia, or at least parts of it, 
together. But  the increased economic interdependence experienced over the last few 
decades has been determined by the logic of markets more than government policies. For 
example, the emergence of East Asian production networks in industries such as electronics 
and automobiles has largely been determined by firms’ relocation decisions, independent 
from intergovernmental plans for regional cooperation (ADB 2008; Ando and Kimura 2005; 
Athukorala 2005). 
Unilateral initiatives by individual Asian countries—in favor of economic liberalization and 
aiming to create incentives to attract investment and promote exports—have facilitated this 
process. Based on the model provided by Japan and Asia’s newly industrializing 
economies,
1
Intergovernmental initiatives for regional cooperation started playing a significant role in 
fostering economic integration only after the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, when the 
Asian model of development underwent a major test. The crisis was important to realize the 
limits of an approach to regionalism primarily based on market forces and to reconsider the 
macroeconomic management pattern followed by Asian countries, which proved to be 
ineffective, too risky, and complacent. Asian policymakers realized the lack of regional 
mechanisms which could have helped avoid the crisis and used to prevent future crises. 
They also understood the intrinsic weaknesses of Asian financial systems and their poor 
state of development. And as a result of extensive dialogue among ASEAN countries, plus 
Japan, the PRC, and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3), they were able to create several 
new initiatives for regional cooperation.  
  during the 1980s members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, shifted from an 
economic policy in favor of import-substitution to one focusing on export-expansion. And 
since the 1990s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was also able to join the group of 
integrating regional economies. Following a “flying-geese”  pattern, Asian countries have 
been able to establish a trade-investment nexus which has played an important role in 
fostering economic development and growth in the region (Yamazawa 1990; Urata 1991). 
Indeed, the financial crisis of 1997–98 was a watershed: it was the most significant triggering 
factor for regional economic and financial cooperation among Asian countries in the last few 
decades (ADB 2008). Prompted by regional dialogue, economic and monetary authorities 
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were able to undertake structural reforms and introduce regulations at national levels which 
strengthened financial markets and increased, in turn, the countries’ economic resilience 
against the 2008–09 global financial crisis. As a matter of fact, the regional cooperation 
dialogue started after the 1997–98 crisis helped Asian economies perform the engine role for 
global economic growth they have been playing in the last few years (ADB 2010).  
Asia’s initiatives in support of regional cooperation and integration can be classified into four 
pillars: (i) trade and investment; (ii) money and finance; (iii) infrastructure and connectivity; 
and (iv) regional public goods (ADB 2006). In trade and investment, Asian economies have 
been experiencing a proliferation of free trade (and investment) agreements (FTAs) involving 
regional members. In money and finance, significant developments were recently achieved 
with the multilateralization of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and the establishment of the 
ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). In infrastructure and connectivity, a 
growing number of initiatives were started under the Great Mekong Subregion (GMS) and 
the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) programs, in addition to the 
ASEAN Infrastructure Fund and region-wide projects such as the Asian Highway and the 
Trans-Asian Railway, under the United Nations’ Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific (ESCAP). Finally, in the regional public goods’ pillar, Asian countries have 
been strengthening dialogue in areas such as natural disasters’ management, environment 
and climate change, energy security, prevention and management of communicable 
diseases, and drugs and human trafficking (ADB 2010). 
Figure 1 provides a schematic view of the analytical framework applied in this paper to the 
analysis of the channels, pillars, and structures used to promote regional economic 
integration in Asia, including initiatives for regional cooperation.  
Figure 1: Asia’s Economic Regionalism: Analytical Framework 
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A recent ADB study took stock of Asia’s institutions for regionalism and suggested the need 
to strengthen such institutions to promote regional economic and social development (ADB 
2010). The study identified 40 intergovernmental institutions for regional integration (IRI), 
including transregional (7); pan-Asian (2); intraregional (10); and subregional (21) ones, 
classified as overarching, functional, and facilitating institutions.
2
                                                 
2 The study did not include non-intergovernmental organizations and other regional cooperation initiatives, 
programs, and groups which support Asian regionalism from broad perspectives and involve the knowledge 
community (such as local think tanks) and the civil society at large. By adding these organizations, the study 
suggested there may be more than one hundred IRIs currently active in Asia. 
 Overarching IRIs such as 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); ASEAN+3, ASEAN, the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) or the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) are seen 
as umbrella arrangements based on the vision of an integrated region, while functional IRIs 
such as AMRO or GMS, are specialized organizations with a specific range of activities and 
 ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
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a technical agenda. In addition, Asia’s facilitating IRI (ADB and ESCAP) are seen as 
international entities  bolstering  regional  cooperation and integration through advisory, 
technical, and financial support.  
While the existing network of IRIs has served Asia well, the institutional architecture for 
regionalism is facing a pressuring  need  to  undertake  structural reforms, as more Asian 
countries intensify their regional and global economic interdependence. As a matter of fact, 
Asian economic integration remains uneven across subregions as well as functional areas, 
having mostly focused on trade in intermediate goods within East Asia: South Asia, Central 
Asia, and the Pacific are de facto not involved in regional production networks. While trade 
between South and East Asia—notably between India and the PRC—is growing, only few 
industries are part of this development. Although East Asia’s intraregional trade shares are 
close to 55%, similar figures remain very low for the other Asia’s subregions. At the same 
time, as Asian economies are rapidly strengthening their ties with the rest of the world, it is of 
utmost importance to ensure that regional and global integration remain compatible: any 
measure aiming to cement Asia’s integration should complement rather than compete with 
global initiatives (ADB 2010). 
Reforms of Asia’s institutional architecture for regionalism are also needed to cement the 
gains that have been so far achieved by regional members and to deepen integration in 
sectors which are still lagging behind. While regional cooperation initiatives are important to 
avoid the recurrence of economic and financial crises by limiting vulnerability to external 
shocks, Asia’s integration needs to move beyond production networks and expand into 
services, skilled labor, financial markets, monetary and exchange rate arrangements, 
initiatives to narrow the income gap, and the provision of other regional public goods. 
High-level political leadership is required to shape Asia’s new institutional architecture for 
economic and financial integration. While the process of Asian regionalism is often seen as 
mostly coming from the bottom up, recently key political leaders have formulated visions for 
a more closely integrated Asia aiming to establish a regional community. Yukio Hatoyama 
and Kevin Rudd, the former Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia, respectively, called for 
the creation of an “East Asian Community” and an “Asia-Pacific Community”, respectively. 
The  PRC’s President,  Hu Jintao,  articulated the vision for a “Harmonious Asia”; Korean 
President Lee Myung-bak suggested a “New Asia Initiative”, and the Indian Prime Minister, 
Manmohan Singh, proposed to establish an “Asian Economic Community”.  
Political leaders seem keen to support closer regionalism through enhanced dialogue and 
projects on economic and security matters. They are showing stronger commitment to closer 
regional integration. But where do this new top-down approach and the traditional bottom-up 
approach meet? What is the desirable structure of a new institutional architecture for 
regional economic and financial integration?
This paper analyzes the results of a recently conducted ADB survey of 1,000 opinion leaders 
from Asian countries, which shed some light on the above questions (ADB 2010). It also 
discusses the need to strengthen existing regional institutions and to create new ones. 
Chapter 2 presents the survey’s methodological approach and provides some basic statistics 
on  the sample composition. Chapter  3 discusses main challenges Asia is facing  to 
strengthen its IRIs. The progress towards closer regional monetary and financial cooperation 
is presented in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion on the creation of an 
Asia-wide economic community and the needed new institutions.  
 To what extent is it possible to convert the 
visions of political leaders into the process of institution building? Will Asia’s IRIs become 
more effective in delivering their mandates?  ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
 
6 
 
2.  OPINION LEADERS’ SURVEY 
In early 2010 the ADB surveyed opinion leaders in Asia and the Pacific about their views on 
the institutional architecture for regional integration. The survey findings suggest that Asia’s 
opinion leaders are increasingly in favor of creating an economically integrated region (ADB 
2010). They feel that while cooperation on trade and finance is progressing, more needs to 
be done to provide economic infrastructure and regional public goods in areas such as 
natural disasters’ management, environmental preservation, communicable diseases, and 
energy and food security. They believe that, to promote closer cooperation and deeper 
economic integration, Asia needs new and stronger institutions for regionalism. They are 
confident that in the long run Asia will be able to create a region-wide economic community.  
The ADB survey used a stratified sample of 3,027 opinion leaders from 19 countries in the 
Asia and the Pacific  region. The sample was organized into five subregions
3
                                                 
3 Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Oceania and the Pacific. 
  and four 
categories of opinion leaders (academics, business leaders, government officials, members 
of media and/or civil society organizations). The sample distribution by country and category 
was based on a weighted average of the population size and its gross domestic product, as 
shown in Table 1. ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
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Table 1: Breakdown of Responses 
Subregion  Country 
Category 
Academia  Business  Government Media/NGO  TOTAL 
Central 
Asia 
Kazakhstan           2            4            4            2           12  
Kyrgyz Republic           1            2            2            1            6  
Uzbekistan           1            2            2            1            6  
Total           4            8            8            4           24  
South     
Asia 
India           16           36           36           16           104  
Pakistan           4           12           14            8           38  
Sri Lanka           3           10           10            3           26  
Total          23           58           60           27           168  
Northeast 
Asia 
PRC          36           70           43            8           157  
Japan          20           79           48            6           153  
Republic of Korea          11           43           12            2           68  
Total          67          192          103           16          378  
Southeast            
Asia 
Indonesia           7           42           23           10           82  
Malaysia          15           10           12            5           42  
Philippines          14           52           52            6           124  
Singapore          23            6           11            1           41  
Thailand           9           20           34            4           67  
Viet Nam           5            2           26            3           36  
Total          73          132          158           29          392  
Pacific  
and 
Oceania 
Australia           6            6            6            4           22  
Fiji Islands           1            2            2            1            6  
PNG           1            2            2            1            6  
Vanuatu           1            1            1            1            4  
Total           9           11           11            7           38  
GRAND TOTAL  176  401  340  83  1,000 
NGO = Nongovernment Organization; PNG = Papua New Guinea; PRC = People's Republic of China. 
Source: ADB (2010). 
Around 77% of respondents were based in either Southeast or Northeast Asia, followed by 
South Asia (16.8%), the Pacific and Oceania (3.8%), and Central Asia (2.4%). Business 
leaders accounted for 40% of respondents, government officials for  34%, academics for 
18%, and opinion leaders from the media and nongovernmental organizations for 8%. The 
profile of total respondents was made up of 71% males and 29% females. The average 
education level of opinion leaders interviewed was very high: on average 61% of them had a 
post-graduate degree, 38% a graduate degree, and a mere 1% had only  completed 
secondary education. In terms of age composition, the largest share (60%) was aged 
between 30 and 49, followed by those aged between 50 and 69 (31%), while only 6% were 
below 30 and 3% above 70. 
The names and contact details of opinion leaders interviewed were gathered from ADB’s 
lists obtained from its headquarters and resident missions. To increase the likelihood of 
response, the survey questionnaire was designed to take no more than 10–15 minutes to 
complete.  To facilitate understanding by  a broad spectrum of respondents, the English 
questionnaire was translated into six languages (Bahasa Indonesian, Japanese, Korean, 
Mandarin, Russian, and Vietnamese). All interviews were conducted online with the help of ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
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an independent surveying firm. The survey was  closed once 1,000 responses were 
collected. 
3.  CHALLENGES TO STRENGTHENING ASIA’S 
INSTITUTIONS FOR REGIONALISM 
The largest majority of Asian opinion leaders believe the benefits of strengthening regional 
economic interdependence outweigh its costs (Figure 2). Regional integration is seen as a 
positive force for Asian countries as it speeds up their economic growth and gives them a 
stronger voice in international forums. Closer regional integration is also perceived as 
helping reduce poverty and improve social indicators, as well as offering an alternative to 
global multilateral institutions. Among the costs associated with regionalism, opinion leaders 
are most concerned about a potential widening of the divide between the rich and the poor, 
which may happen because the benefits from closer regional economic ties are unevenly 
distributed within and across countries. However, regional initiatives such as improvements 
in infrastructure and connectivity may help narrowing the development gap. Perceived costs 
of regionalism include also a loss of independence over national economic policies and an 
erosion of competitive advantages over neighboring countries, as national standards are 
harmonized or mutually recognized. Other costs of closer regional integration are related to 
the weakening of economic links with non-Asian countries and the feared erosion of national 
culture and identity.  
Figure 2: Perceived Costs and Benefits of Regional Economic Integration 
 
Note: Values are based on total response (1,000). The question was: Rate the costs and benefits for your country of 
strengthening economic relations with other countries in Asia and the Pacific. 
Source: ADB (2010). 
Concerning the effects of regional cooperation, opinion leaders believe that infrastructure 
projects to improve connectivity and establish energy links offer the biggest benefits, 
followed by the creation of a region-wide free trade and investment area. Regional dialogues 
on macroeconomic policy, financial-sector development, the provision of regional public 
goods, and security issues are also perceived as highly beneficial, followed by mechanisms 
to coordinate monetary and exchange-rate policies. Figure 3 lists such functional areas in 
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order of importance, as suggested by opinion leaders. These findings are consistent with 
those of a previous similar ADB survey conducted in 2007 to a relatively smaller group of 
opinion leaders (ADB 2008; Capannelli 2010).
4
Figure 3: Advantages of Regional Cooperation  
 
 
Note: Values are based on total responses (1,000). The question was: Rate the advantages for your country from 
participating in different initiatives for regional cooperation.  
Source: ADB (2010). 
As Figure 4 shows, nearly 75% of the region's opinion leaders believe that Asian policy 
makers should build stronger institutions for regionalism. They agree that existing institutions 
should be strengthened by increasing human and financial resources, receiving more 
delegated powers from national agencies, improving their governance structures, eliminating 
unnecessary functional duplications, consolidating existing arrangements into region-wide 
ones, and defining a clear division of labor among similar institutions.  
Around half of opinion leaders believe that new institutions should be created where gaps 
exist or where existing ones are inefficient or ineffective. In particular, two main areas where 
new regional institutions are deemed to be more urgently needed are in developing 
infrastructure and providing regional public goods. At the same time, opinion leaders believe 
the need to create new institutions is less pressing in areas such as trade and investment or 
money and finance, where closer regionalism can be achieved by empowering existing 
institutions. 
                                                 
4 The ranking of advantages remained the same in 2007 and 2010, as did the general intensity. The proportion 
believing that the creation of a region-wide free trade and investment area would have high or very high benefits 
increased from 69% of respondents in 2007 to 76% in 2010.  
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Figure 4: Readiness and Modalities for Asia's Institutions for Regional Integration 
 
Is the time ripe to strengthen 
institutions for regionalism? 
 
 
Modalities to enhance institutions for Asian integration 
 
Note: Values are based on total response (1,000). The questions were: Q1: Do you share the view that the time is 
ripe for leaders in Asia and the Pacific to greatly strengthen the capabilities of institutions for regional integration? Q2: 
Indicate to what extent you agree (disagree) with the appropriateness of the different modalities to enhance 
institutions for regional integration in Asia and the Pacific. 
Source: ADB (2010). 
The creation of an “Asian economic community” is considered by the largest majority of 
surveyed opinion leaders (more than 80%) as one of the main long-term objectives of 
regional economic integration. While the actual structure and articulation of such a 
community was not clearly specified in the questionnaire responses, it is generally regarded 
as a comprehensive institution covering a wide range of operational areas and member 
countries. Besides a regional economic community, Asian opinion leaders see the formation 
of a region-wide free trade and investment area and a dialogue  to strengthen financial 
stability and coordinate macroeconomic policies as an even more desirable objective of 
regionalism.
5
                                                 
5 Respectively 86% and 85% of surveyed opinion leaders marked them as highly desirable or desirable long-term 
objectives of integration among Asian countries. 
 A closer dialogue on monetary and exchange-rate policy and the creation of a 
regional security zone also featured near the top in the list of preferences. Creating an Asian 
single currency or a political union received considerably less support. In particular, only 
33% of respondents felt a political union was desirable or highly so, while 35% remained 
neutral (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Desirability of Regional Integration Objectives 
 
Note: Values are based on total response (1,000). The question was: Thinking of your long-term vision for 
regionalism, rate the desirability of various integration objectives among countries in Asia and the Pacific. 
Source: ADB (2010). 
Creating an economic community at the  subregional level, is seen as a high priority in 
Southeast and South Asia, perhaps partly because ASEAN and SAARC have both been 
promoting similar ideas. In particular, ASEAN is committed to creating an ASEAN Economic 
Community based on a single market and production base by 2015. On the other hand, 
opinion leaders from Central Asia and the Pacific consider the establishment of an economic 
community a much lower priority. Opinion leaders form Central Asia were more interested in 
establishing a security zone and they also registered the highest inclination to create a 
political union. These results are not too surprising, given Central Asian countries’ recent 
past as part of the Soviet Union. In the Pacific, the highest priorities were to establish a free 
trade and investment area and a dialogue on macro-financial issues (Figure 6).  
0%  20%  40%  60%  80%  100% 
Free Trade & Investment Area 
Macroeconomic Policy & Financial 
Dialogue 
Economic Community 
Monetary & Exchange Rate Policy 
Dialogue 
Regional Security Zone 
Monetary Union 
Political Union 
Highly desirable/desirable  Neither desirable nor undesirable  Highly undesirable/undesirable  Don't Know ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
 
12 
 
Figure 6: Desirability of Selected Regional Integration Objectives by Asia’s 
Subregions 
 
Note: Values are based on total response (1,000). The question was: Thinking of your long-
term vision for regionalism, rate the desirability of various integration objectives among 
countries in your region. 
Source: ADB (2010). 
The realization of these long-term objectives requires the enhancement of existing 
institutions for regionalism and the creation of new ones. The survey’s results show that 
opinion leaders believe several new institutions need to be created in the near future to 
promote Asia-wide economic integration. A “Financial Stability Dialogue” emerged as the 
most needed new regional institution as the importance to ensure regional financial stability 
by strengthening regulation, monitoring, and dialogue between the public and private sector 
was suggested as very high or high by 78% by Asia’s opinion leaders. The consolidation of 
existing Asia’s FTAs and development of guidelines for best regional practice through the 
creation of a ”Free Trade and Investment Area”  emerged  as the second most needed 
institution in the view of Asia’s opinion leaders, as Figure 7 shows.  ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
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Figure 7: Support of Institutions for Asian Integration  
 
Note: Values are based on responses from 1,000 opinion leaders in Asia and the Pacific to ADB's 2010 perception 
survey. The question was: Rate the importance to create the following institutions for regional integration in Asia and 
the Pacific, leaving aside the issue of exact membership composition of each institution. 
Source: ADB (2010). 
The third priority was the creation of an “Asian infrastructure forum”, which is seen as playing 
an important role in  improving  connectivity also by coordinating and integrating existing 
initiatives at subregional level. The next three priorities in terms of new institutions for 
regionalism were, respectively, the creation of an “Asian monetary fund”, to conduct regional 
financial monitoring and pull resources together for liquidity support to regional members, an 
“Asian secretariat for economic cooperation”, to create a common market and coordinate 
macroeconomic policies in the region, and an “Asian security dialogue”  to ensure the 
avoidance of military conflicts, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the solution of 
security-related issues.  
About 50% of opinion leaders believe in the importance of creating a “Council of Asia”, i.e., 
an umbrella organization which brings together existing region-  and function-specific 
institutions to capture their synergies and complementarities. The lowest priorities, were 
institutions à-la Europe, or, in descending order, the creation of an “Asian court of justice”, to 
ensure the proper application of the region's rules, norms, and standards, and to adjudicate 
the region's cross-border disputes, an “Asian  executive”, to represent the region's 
governments, and a “parliament” for raising citizens’ instances (which less than one third of 
opinion leaders considered to be a highly important or important priority).  
The remainder of this paper will analyze the progress of monetary and financial cooperation 
in the region, with a focus on the role played by its institutions. Based on the survey results 
and the suggestions provided by Asia’s opinion leaders, it will also discuss the need to 
create new institutions supporting regional integration given the perspectives for creating an 
“Asian economic community” in the medium to long term. 
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4.  PROGRESS OF ASIA’S MONETARY AND FINANCIAL 
COOPERATION 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 was the single main factor that triggered monetary and 
financial cooperation among countries in the region. Collective action was deemed 
necessary to address the root causes of the crisis and help solving structural weaknesses 
related to market development and regulatory frameworks which were—and to a large extent 
still are—generalized throughout the region. The crisis revealed how Asia was lagging 
behind in terms of financial systems’ development compared with  the real sector and 
production networks. Poor performance was due to several factors including: (i) financial 
intermediation predominantly conducted by the banking sector; (ii) scarcity of long-term 
credit and underdevelopment of capital markets, especially public and private bonds; (iii) 
several weaknesses in regulatory and supervisory frameworks, such as underdeveloped 
domestic credit bureaus, or accounting and reporting standards; (iv) lack of competition in 
domestic financial sectors; and (v) poor corporate governance.  
In response to the crisis, an important tool used by Asian policy makers to address their 
financial systems’ structural weaknesses was the introduction of domestic reforms aimed to 
increase efficiency and stability. Regional cooperation initiatives were also strengthened as 
safeguards against the whims of global markets and as a platform for promoting economic 
development. In 1998, as the crisis was still unfolding, ASEAN members started a regional 
Surveillance Process to monitor the trend of their macroeconomic variables including 
monetary, financial, and fiscal indicators. The Executives’ Meeting of Asia-Pacific Central 
Banks (EMEAP) also strengthened its role to coordinate Central Banks’ initiatives and the 
ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Process was set up. The latter established the Economic 
Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD), which prompted the creation of the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI) in 2000, and the Asian Bonds Markets Initiative (ABMI) in 2002.  
The existing main forums for Asia’s financial cooperation and their functions are summarized 
in Table 2. The ERPD was established as an intergovernmental institution to support 
regional discussions on macroeconomic policies and structural reforms, including 
collaboration on a broad range of issues, from monetary to fiscal policies, financial regulation 
and development of market infrastructure, as well as early-warning systems to assess 
financial vulnerabilities. ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
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Table 2: Main forums for Asia’s financial cooperation 
  ASEAN  ASEAN+3  EMEAP  APEC  ASEM  EAS 
Year established  1967  1999  1991  1989  1996  2005 
No. of members  10  13  11  21  45  16 
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
Policy dialogue/ 
information exchange  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Surveillance/ 
Peer review  √  √  √       
Regional financing 
arrangements  √  √  √       
Regional capital-
market development  √  √  √  √     
Capacity building  √  √  √  √  √   
Research  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
Notes: 
APEC=Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (includes Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, USA, Canada, 
Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Russia; ASEAN=Association of Southeast Asian Nations; ASEAN+3=ASEAN countries plus 
The PRC, People's Republic of, Japan, Korea, Republic of; ASEM=Asia-Europe Meeting (includes Mongolia, 
Pakistan, and 27 EU member countries); EMEAP=Executives’ Meetings of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks; 
SEACEN=South East Asian Central Banks (includes Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Nepal, and Sri Lanka); 
SEANZA=South East Asia New Zealand and Australia (includes Mongolia, Macao, Papua New Guinea, Australia, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka; Bangladesh, and Iran); ACD=Asian Cooperation Dialogue; and EAS=East 
Asia Summit.  
ACD Working Group on Financial Cooperation meets once a year. Proposed Finance Ministers Meeting in 2006 was 
postponed.  
EAS held its first Informal Senior EAS Finance Officials' Dialogue in September 2007 in Jakarta, Indonesia.  
Source: (ADB 2008). 
It must be noted, however, that while ASEAN+3 financial cooperation covers a wide range of 
activities, from information exchange to regional financing arrangements and capacity 
building programs, EPRD cooperation remains mostly limited to information exchange. In 
fact, besides initiatives such as the CMI and ABMI, East Asian authorities have yet to 
consider adopting common monetary and exchange rate regimes, financial regulations, or 
binding policy coordination agreements. In other words,  the ERPD represents the first, 
necessary step for regional cooperation, where member countries share peer information 
through macroeconomic and financial monitoring and policy dialogue. A second step could 
be the harmonization of regional standards introducing the mutual recognition of existing 
regulations and practices. Eventually, more advanced cooperation could occur through a 
gradual shift of  sovereignty from national agencies to regional institutions and ultimately 
through full policy coordination (Kawai and Takagi 2005). 
Two major initiatives of financial cooperation through which Asian countries have made 
some progress towards setting regional standards are the CMI and the ABMI, with the 
former seeking to shield East Asian economies from the recurrence of currency and liquidity 
crises, and the latter aiming to help develop East Asia’s local-currency bond markets and 
deploy the region’s savings for regional investments. The development of East Asia’s bond 
markets is also being fostered by the introduction of Asian Bond Funds (ABFs) promoted by 
EMEAP. 
4.1  The Chiang Mai Initiative and its multilateralization 
Designed to address short-term foreign exchange liquidity problems, the CMI expanded to 
the PRC, Japan, and Korea the ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) introduced in 1977 by the 
monetary authorities of the then ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
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Singapore, and Thailand) to establish reciprocal currency swaps. It also expanded the ASA 
to the newer ASEAN members (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and 
Viet Nam), although the swaps with the “Plus-Three” countries were limited to the original 
five members, that were in effect the ones hardest hit by the crisis. Modeled on the ASA, 
bilateral contracts and repurchase facilities under the CMI defined the amount, duration, and 
currency to be used in the swap, providing at the same time an institutional mechanism to 
pursue further negotiations among ASEAN+3 countries. 
Such institutional mechanism proved to be an important factor in transforming the system of 
bilateral swaps into a regional pooling arrangement of collectively managed reserves 
through the CMI’s multilateralization (CMIM), which was initially announced by ASEAN+3 
Finance Ministers in 2008, later introduced at their ,meeting in Bali in 2009, and finally made 
effective in 2010. The CMIM implied adopting a new approach to contributions by member 
countries to a common reserve pool, a new decision-making mechanism to govern the fund, 
and the conduct of a new regional surveillance process to ensure that members maintain 
proper macroeconomic and financial conditions to repay loans to the fund.  
In terms of contributions, the “Plus-Three” countries agreed to collectively cover 80% of the 
common reserve pool, leaving the remaining 20% to ASEAN members. In particular, the 
PRC  and Japan were able to reach an important compromise by agreeing to contribute 
equally  to the fund (32% each)
6
                                                 
6 The 32% share actually includes a contribution from the PRC of 28.5% and Hong Kong, China of 3.5%. 
  while it was agreed that the Republic of Korea would 
provide half of that amount (16%). Contribution shares to the CMIM fund from ASEAN 
countries were agreed based on individual members’ financing capacity. Table 3 shows the 
CMIM details, including not only its financial contributions, but also borrowing arrangements 
and voting powers. It is worth noting the intrinsic bias in favor of small countries built into the 
CMIM, as the largest economies (the PRC, Japan) can borrow no more than 50% of their 
contributions from the fund, while the five smallest ASEAN economies are entitled to borrow 
up to five times their contributions. Similarly, small countries have a larger voting power 
compared with their share of the fund’s total value.  ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
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Table 3: Contributions, Borrowing Multipliers, and Voting Power under the 
Multilateralized Chiang Mai Initiative 
Members 
Financial 
contributions 
Borrowing 
arrangements  Voting power 
$ billion 
% 
share  Multiplier 
Quota       
($ billion) 
No. of 
basic 
votes 
No. of votes 
based on 
contributions 
Total 
no. 
votes 
% 
share 
PRC + Hong Kong, China  38.40  32.00              40.00  28.41 
- PRC  34.20  28.50  0.50  17.10  1.60  34.20  35.80  25.43 
- Hong Kong, China  4.20  3.50  2.50  10.50  0.00  4.20  4.20  2.98 
Japan   38.40  32.00  0.50  19.20  1.60  38.40  40.00  28.41 
Republic of Korea   19.20  16.00  1.00  19.20  1.60  19.20  20.80  14.77 
Plus Three Countries  96.00  80.00        4.80  96.00  100.80  71.59 
Brunei Darussalam  0.03  0.03  5.00  0.20  1.60  0.03  1.63  1.16 
Cambodia   0.12  0.10  5.00  0.60  1.60  0.12  1.72  1.22 
Indonesia   4.55  3.79  2.50  11.36  1.60  4.55  6.15  4.37 
Lao PDR  0.03  0.03  5.00  0.20  1.60  0.03  1.63  1.16 
Malaysia   4.55  3.79  2.50  11.36  1.60  4.55  6.15  4.37 
Myanmar   0.06  0.05  5.00  0.30  1.60  0.06  1.66  1.18 
Philippines   4.55  3.79  2.50  11.36  1.60  4.55  6.15  4.37 
Singapore   4.55  3.79  2.50  11.36  1.60  4.55  6.15  4.37 
Thailand   4.55  3.79  2.50  11.36  1.60  4.55  6.15  4.37 
Viet Nam   1.00  0.83  5.00  5.00  1.60  1.00  2.60  1.85 
ASEAN  24.00  20.00        16.00  24.00  40.00  28.41 
ASEAN+3  120.00  100.00        20.80  120.00  140.80  100.00 
Note: ASEAN+3 = ASEAN countries plus the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and the Republic of Korea. 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat. http://www.asean.org/22536.htm 
At their 2009 Bali Meeting, ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers agreed to set the initial CMIM size 
at  $120 billion,  expanding considerably the value  of existing bilateral contracts, which 
amounted to only $84 million at the end of 2008.  Although it is not easy to assess the 
optimum size of this fund, many analysts argue that $120 billion is inadequate to tackle 
possible liquidity shortages of Asian economies and are in favor of a substantial increase of 
the fund’s total amount, also considering the very rapid expansion in the size of Asian 
economies and their international reserves. For example, when challenged by the 2008–09 
global financial crisis, Asian countries required approximately between $40 and $60 billion in 
liquidity support, while the largest five ASEAN economies are able individually to access less 
than  $12 million from CMIM funds. As matter of fact, when the global financial crisis 
unfolded, the Korean and Singaporean monetary authorities did not try to activate the CMI 
but asked instead for the mobilization of bilateral support lines from the US Federal Reserve. 
Considering that the current CMIM size  is approximately only 2.5% of total ASEAN+3 
countries’ international reserves, there seems to be large room to increase the CMIM fund’s 
size (Soesastro 2009).  
Another criticism of the CMIM is the close link to programs of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), which many would like to reduce or eliminate. Following the existing financing 
arrangements, the mobilization of more than 20% of individual countries’ quotas needs to be 
reviewed by the IMF, which may decide to apply conditionality rules linked to its programs. 
Although the introduction of the new IMF’s Short-Term Liquidity Facility—which enables ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
 
18 
 
certain countries to borrow without conditions—has partially softened this criticism, several 
analysts have been arguing for a considerable increase (up to 100%) of the amount of 
money CMIM countries should be able to borrow without IMF conditionality.  
Leaving aside the issues of size and IMF conditionality, the CMIM remains a fundamentally 
important step for the institutionalization of Asia’s financial cooperation. In addition to the 
agreement on individual countries’ contributions reached in Bali, CMIM members agreed to 
adopt a flexible decision-making structure, whereby only decisions on fundamental issues
7
In terms of regional macroeconomic and financial surveillance, the innovation introduced by 
the CMIM is the setting up of a new agency, AMRO, with the mandate to detect emerging 
vulnerabilities and monitor the trend of key macroeconomic and financial variables, to avoid 
the moral hazard problem related to unconditional financing and ensure that CMIM members 
maintain proper conditions to repay loans from the fund. Recently established in Singapore, 
AMRO is expected to perform regional macroeconomic surveillance, supplementing—not 
replacing—the national and global surveillance functions performed by the IMF through 
Article IV missions and the publication of reports. As it becomes fully operational, the amount 
member countries can withdraw from the CMIM free from the IMF conditionality clause could 
be increased, allowing ASEAN+3 members to rely more on their own assessments when 
making lending decisions.  
 
require consensus, while operational issues on lending and repayment conditions can be 
decided by a weighted majority system linked to individual countries’  contributions. This 
development—constituting a revision to ASEAN’s consensus principle—represents a major 
boost for the fund’s effectiveness and it helps preventing any of the “Plus-Three” countries 
individually, or ASEAN as a group, from holding veto power on operational issues. 
The opinion leaders’ survey included a question on the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ 
decision to multilateralize the CMI. The results, summarized in Figure 8, show that more 
than 80% of respondents agreed on the importance of CMIM as a milestone for Asia’s 
financial cooperation, while approximately 75% believed that AMRO is not a substitute for 
the IMF, but that its role in regional surveillance will complement the work being done by the 
IMF.  
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Figure 8: Views on the Multilateralization of the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Note: Values are based on responses from 1,000 opinion leaders in Asia and the Pacific to ADB's 2010 perception 
survey. The question was: Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements on the 
creation of the new ASEAN+3 surveillance agency. 
Source: ADB (2010). 
Overall, the CMIM represents a highly significant institutional development for the progress 
of Asian regionalism as it not only reduces transaction costs and duplications, but also offers 
a new platform for the management of regional monetary arrangements. In particular, it sets 
a model for addressing other priority areas for regional cooperation besides monetary 
issues. For example, enhanced intergovernmental dialogue has spurred further cooperation 
in areas such as trade, investment, and financial supervision and regulation. The CMIM 
governance structure could be used as a model for delivering regional public goods such as 
environmental preservation, disaster preparedness, and disease prevention. The new CMIM 
institutional set up could also serve to speed up financial market development, for example, 
by establishing a fund to invest in developing regional bond markets, and in turn promote a 
better use of the region’s huge savings to help finance its massive investment requirements.  
As AMRO grows to become a strong and solid institution and the CMIM is delinked from the 
IMF, the region could acquire a de facto “Asian monetary fund”. In fact, once proper 
governance structures and technical expertise are in place, and once AMRO is capable of 
introducing relevant policy conditionality, it could effectively evolve into the Secretariat of an 
“Asian monetary fund” created through an expansion of the CMIM’s size and an enlargement 
of its membership and functions to include new financing instruments such as precautionary 
credit lines and others. Such a “Fund” is to be seen as complementing the IMF role in the 
region by 
4.2  Developing bonds markets in Asia 
intensively monitoring Asian economies and by working independently of the IMF 
during idiosyncratic and localized crises, while closely cooperating with it in the provision of 
liquidity financing and conditionality rules during bigger financial crises. 
The main reason behind the establishment of the ABMI and ABF was the intention to 
achieve a more efficient recycling of Asian savings into Asian investment by developing 
bond markets denominated in local currencies and strengthening national financial systems’ ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
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resilience to economic shocks. The 1997–98 crisis was indeed made more severe by the 
absence of well-developed bond markets, which left Asian companies no choice but to rely 
on bank loans and borrow in foreign currency (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai 2004). 
As regional financial authorities realized such weakness of their domestic systems, they 
decided to promote regional initiatives—namely the ABMI and ABF—to develop local-
currency denominated bond markets, together with the introduction of domestic regulatory 
reforms.  
These initiatives have generally facilitated a better understanding of how financial operators 
could overcome market impediments and promoted the alignment of national policies with 
international best practices. As a result, capital markets today play a much larger role in East 
Asian countries’ financial intermediation than in the period immediately before the 1997–98 
crisis (ADB 2008, 2010). In fact, recent data show that bond markets increased from about 
one fifth of total financial intermediation in East Asian countries in 1995 to approximately one 
third in 2010. During the same period the share of total outstanding local-currency bonds 
issued in East Asia in relation to the world’s total increased from about 2.5% to more than 
8%.
8
Created in 2002, the ABMI become fully operational in 2003, also with the establishment of a 
dedicated website (AsianBondOnline) which offers a one-stop market data and information 
portal for institutional investors. Over the years the ABMI has implemented several activities 
organized under various working groups aiming at improving national regulatory frameworks 
by: (i) establishing a credit guarantee mechanism, (ii) strengthening domestic credit rating 
agencies; (iii) disseminating information on national and regional bond markets; (iv) assessing 
the feasibility of regional foreign exchange clearing and settlement systems; and (v) creating 
new securitized debt instruments. 
 
More recently (April 2010) ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers endorsed the creation of the Credit 
Guarantee and Investment Facility (CGIF), facilitating in turn capital markets’ development 
and making the regional financial system less vulnerable to fluctuations induced by abrupt 
changes in macroeconomic variables. Established as an ADB trust fund with an initial capital 
of $700 million, the CGIF mandate is to provide credit guarantees to local corporations to 
enable them raise long-term funding instruments by improving the conditions to issue bonds 
within their domestic markets and across ASEAN+3 countries, facilitating in turn a solution to 
currency and maturity mismatches  and promoting the harmonization of standards and 
practices for bond issuances in regional infrastructure and other key areas.  
Regional cooperation initiatives promoted by East Asian central banks through the creation 
of the ABF1 and ABF2 under the EMEAP have also contributed to improving the 
attractiveness of the region’s bond markets. Established in 2003, the ABF1 gathered a total 
of US$ 1 billion of international reserves, which were invested in US$-denominated 
sovereign and quasi-sovereign debt issued in East Asian economies. Subsequently, with the 
creation of ABF2 in 2005, the amount of invested reserves was doubled to US$ 2 million and 
its focus shifted to local-currency denominated sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds. A 
further $2 billion were allocated by EMEAP economies to the Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund, 
which also invests in local-currency sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds.  
Overall, ABMI and ABFs have greatly helped the growth of bond markets in East Asia and 
reduce currency and maturity mismatches. As a result, East Asian economies were able to 
withstand the 2008–09 crisis showing relatively stronger resilience than the US and Europe. 
A lot still remains to be done, however, to harmonize rules across the region, strengthen 
market infrastructure, overcome remaining market impediments, and tighten legal and 
regulatory frameworks. Local corporate bond markets remain, with the exception of the 
                                                 
8 For detailed figures, see the AsianBondsOnline website at: http://www.asianbondsonline.adb.org/ 
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Republic of Korea, underdeveloped, and Asian authorities need to promote their growth to 
attract more investment in the region. Domestic reforms and regional cooperation initiatives 
are needed in this area especially to improve accounting standards, market infrastructure, 
and legal systems.  
An  important  institutional  development in support of financial cooperation is  the  possible 
creation of an “Asian bond markets forum” with the aim of standardizing market practices 
and harmonizing  cross-border regulations of financial transactions.  Another possible 
development relates to the enhancement of domestic rating agencies through capacity 
building programs, as credit rating agencies of East Asian countries are often relatively small 
and tend to use non-comparable methodologies and benchmarks in their rating process, 
needing therefore some form of standardization and harmonization across the region (ADB 
2010).  
The survey results of opinion leaders shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7 suggest that Asian 
countries may find it convenient to further institutionalize their regional cooperation initiatives 
by promoting closer dialogue on macro-financial issues. As Asian policy makers strengthen 
existing measures, there is room to create a new institution to facilitate a dialogue in 
promoting financial stability: an “Asian financial stability dialogue”—as it was proposed by 
the ADB—could indeed reveal itself to be very helpful for improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of Asia’s financial markets as well as macroeconomic policy formulation (ADB 
2008).  
Such new institution would promote the development of the region’s financial markets and 
address their vulnerabilities by bringing together all relevant authorities—from central banks, 
to finance ministries, financial supervisory and regulatory agencies, as well as private sector 
corporations. The “Dialogue” would  help authorities strengthen their domestic regulations 
and supervisory functions  and coordinate their regional  efforts through information 
exchange, the mutual recognition of market practices, and the harmonization of minimum 
supervisory rules  in a wide range of areas including capital flows and capital account 
liberalization.  The “Dialogue”  would  also give Asian  authorities  a stronger voice  in 
international forums and play a role similar to that performed by the Financial Stability Board 
at a global level. Its ultimate aim is to make Asia a more stable and resilient region in terms 
of dealing with future crises through improved regulation and supervision, including closer 
coordination with global agencies.  
5.  TOWARDS AN ASIA-WIDE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
The institutions supporting Asia’s monetary and financial cooperation discussed in section 4 
cannot be taken in isolation: they need to be understood in the wider context of 
strengthening Asia’s move  towards closer regional and global integration. The pillars of 
Asian regionalism presented in Figure 1 include initiatives not only in the area of money and 
finance, but also in trade and investment, infrastructure and connectivity, and regional public 
goods: an Asian economic community should cover these pillars as well.  
Asia’s opinion leaders suggested that new functional institutions be created in each pillar, 
including regional security as a public good. They indicated that an umbrella organization 
such as a “Council for Asia” may also be needed to coordinate the overall regional 
architecture.  In addition to the  new functional institutions for monetary and financial 
integration already discussed in section 4, opinion leaders suggested the need to establish 
several new regional frameworks and organizations including a “, an “Asia-wide FTA”, and 
several forums for “regional public goods” (Figure 7).  
A recent study by the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI)  articulated the need to 
create a “pan-Asian infrastructure forum” to help coordinate and integrate existing regional 
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regional consensus among key Asian stakeholders and prioritize regional infrastructure 
projects with the assistance of an expert advisory group. Such an institution could help to 
develop harmonized regulatory standards based on international best practices, and extend 
national treatment to foreign investors to encourage private sector participation. It could 
contribute to exchange information, conduct joint-research, and develop a common regional 
framework to handle and mitigate negative social and environmental impacts created by 
infrastructure projects. In addition to the forum, the ADBI study also proposed the creation of 
an “Asian infrastructure fund” to finance selected projects for regional infrastructure 
development (ADBI 2009).
9
To date, Asia’s approach to regional infrastructure cooperation has been flexible, pragmatic, 
and driven by the market. While large top-down programs such as the Asian Highway and 
the Trans-Asian Railway did not perform as expected and proceeded only at a slow pace, 
bottom-up cooperation, based on good relations among a small group of members pursuing 
common objectives,  has  been relatively more  successful,  manageable,  and flexible. The 
GMS and CAREC programs are good examples of bottom-up cooperation in subregional 
infrastructure development by a relatively small group of countries (Kuroda, Kawai, and 
Nangia 2008). 
 
During the last twenty years, cooperation initiatives under the trade and investment pillar 
experienced an exponential growth in FTAs involving Asian countries. The number of FTAs 
that were signed by Asian economies increased from a total of four agreements in 1990 to 
45 in 2000 and 112 in 2010. Similarly, the total number of FTAs that were only proposed or 
still under discussion and that involve at least one Asian country increased from only one in 
1990 to nine in 2000 and 109 in 2010 (ADB 2010; Capannelli, Lee, and Petri 2010). Such 
proliferation of Asian FTAs, which is largely related to the crisis of global trade and 
investment negotiations in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO), has 
helped to deepen trade links between Asian countries. But it also creates regional 
coordination problems as the contents of these FTAs, including their coverage and rules of 
origin, are usually very different from each others, creating a “noodle bowl” effect and 
requiring some form of regional cooperation initiative to limit their costs (Baldwin 1996, 2006; 
Feridhanusetyawan 2005; Menon 2009). 
The creation of an “Asia-wide FTA” which consolidates existing bilateral and plurilateral 
FTAs agreements into a single regional agreement offers an effective solution, with great 
potential benefits not only for Asia but also for the rest of the world. On the one hand, such a 
large FTA would help realize sizeable economies of scale, boost  the region’s  business 
environment by eliminating domestic-policy distortions to intra-regional trade and investment, 
and facilitate technology transfer. At the same time, it would also help to solve the Doha 
Round impasse as it would create an incentive for non-Asian countries to align themselves 
with the content and structure of an “Asia-wide FTA” given its size-effect on global trade. 
Once a region-wide FTA is formed, it may also be easier for Asian countries to establish a 
customs union by introducing a common external tariff among its members, as the European 
Economic Community did in 1968 (ADB 2010). 
The geographical coverage of an “Asia-wide FTA” could be gradually expanded through 
concentric circles, using the “ASEAN+” concept. From an ASEAN+3 FTA
10, a region-wide 
agreement could expand into an ASEAN+6 agreement
11
                                                 
9 As a matter of fact, in May 2011 ASEAN countries agreed to establish an ASEAN Infrastructure Fund (AIF) with 
an initial capital of $800 million. The aim of the fund is to finance regional infrastructure projects. 
, and eventually embrace other 
10 There is an existing proposal for creating an East Asia Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA). 
11 There is also a proposal to create a Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) among 
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Asian countries willing to join the group. An “Asia-wide FTA” could eventually be linked with 
APEC
12
As discussed in section 3, the results of the survey of Asia’s opinion leaders highlighted the 
relative lack of formal cooperation initiatives in the area of regional public goods, when 
compared with those already started in other areas. The creation of several “forums” aimed 
at improving the delivery of “regional public goods” would help complete the formation of an 
Asian economic community and reduce the region’s vulnerability which has intrinsically 
emerged with the negative externalities generated by its  increased intraregional 
interdependence.  Asia still lacks proper institutions to coordinate the delivery of regional 
public goods in areas such as environment and climate change, disaster risk management, 
energy and food security, health concerns, and drugs and human trafficking. Indeed, the list 
of issues related to each of these areas can be very long.  
 and the EU as well, forming a major building block for global trade negotiations and 
help the completion of the Doha Round. While it remains quite difficult to have many parties 
(and interest groups) reach consensus on a single agreement, an Asia-wide FTA could 
target to consolidate at least a core set of fundamental issues setting a minimum common 
regional denominator, while leaving non-fundamental issues to be governed by the existing 
FTAs. 
For example, environment-related issues include loss of biodiversity, deforestation, coastal 
management, aquatic resource depletion, rising sea levels, air and water pollution, and 
several others. Natural calamities such as  earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, 
flooding, and drought seem to have increased in frequency and intensity in the last few years 
and regional forums dealing with disaster risk management can help find sustainable 
solutions for the affected areas. International cooperation has also proven to be very 
effective in health-related areas such as prevention and management of communicable 
diseases such as  human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome, 
avian influenza, and severe acute respiratory syndrome. Energy and food security is another 
area where regional forums could help Asian economies to diversify their sources and 
mitigate the impact of uneven distribution of natural resources across countries. Most of the 
initiatives in these areas are still initiated by special interest groups, individual countries, or 
existing forums at global level. They rarely originate from Asian institutions and initiatives, or 
coordinated region-wide (Sandler 2005).  
Creating an Asian economic community requires several of the institutions listed above to be 
created to deepen regional integration in a broad range of issues. At the same time, 
establishing a regional economic community also requires enough buy-in from individual 
countries. This condition implies that for each proposed new initiative, or institution, the net 
benefits from integration should be made explicit and it should be clear that national 
sovereignty losses be more than compensated by gains in shared regional sovereignty. 
Moreover, to achieve an adequate balance of powers, an Asian economic community should 
be built on the concept of collective leadership to make all participants feel they have an 
important role to play in the regional institutional setup.  
Openness and transparency should be used as two general principles to help shape the new 
regional institutional architecture. Asia’s original ”open regionalism” concept reflects an 
approach that minimizes discrimination against non-members (Drysdale 2006; Garnaut 
1994; Yamazawa 1990). Although Asia’s traditional high dependency on non-regional 
markets and technologies may have imposed this approach by necessity more than virtue, 
the openness principle ensures that initiatives for economic integration also foster Asia’s 
global links. At the same time, ensuring transparency of regional institutions is an important 
factor to enhance their accountability. Introducing a proper feedback system to evaluate 
                                                 
12 Recent discussions on the expansion of the Free Trade Agreement of Asia and the Pacific (FTAAP) to large 
APEC economies such as Japan and the US represents a promising development. FTAAP’s potential impact 
may however be limited by the fact that is seems unlikely that the PRC will decide to join the agreement. ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
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results and ensure greater participation of the civil society in the governance structures of 
regional institutions are also important ingredients in designing effective organizations 
leading to the creation of a regional economic community. 
Will Asia be able to shape a regional architecture for economic and financial integration that 
covers a wide range of issues and whose institutions provide net gains to their members by 
using collective leadership and shared sovereignty, while remaining open and transparent? 
The pronounced diversity existing among Asian economies, societies, histories, cultures, 
and political systems suggests that the path towards regionalism may not be an easy one to 
follow. It will be difficult for all countries together to be ready to increase their regional 
economic interdependence at the same time. Asian cooperation and integration will likely 
continue to be characterized by variable geometries, following a multi-track and multi-speed 
approach based on the readiness and interest of each country to join regional initiatives and 
institutions (ADB 2008, 2010). A regional economic community should capitalize on Asia’s 
diversity by respecting its styles and traditions. It should not impose a single model but be 
governed by flexibility, adaptation, and continuous transformation to be able to cope with 
rapidly changing internal and external conditions. 
Given the relatively high degree of global integration that characterizes Asian economies, 
the prosperity that can be generated by a more deeply integrated region is to be shared not 
only by individual Asian countries but with the entire world. Asian political leaders should be 
ready, however, to translate into action their declarations of intent regarding closer 
regionalism, create proper structures and new institutions to start a top-down approach to 
regional integration, as well as mobilize sufficient financial resources to ensure that future 
initiatives will be solid and sustainable. The 1,000 Asian opinion leaders who replied to the 
ADB survey are largely confident that the benefits of regionalism outweigh its costs by a 
substantial margin. They are part of an expanding and vibrant knowledge community which 
provides intellectual support to the progressive move towards closer Asian integration. The 
challenge facing the creation of a regional economic community is to bring this enthusiasm 
to the grassroots level and give new impetus to the bottom-up approach by involving the civil 
society in the process. ADBI Working Paper 308     Capannelli                                                                                                                         
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